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UP IN THE AEREO: DID THE SUPREME COURT JUST 
ELIMINATE THE VOLITIONAL CONDUCT REQUIREMENT 
FOR DIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT? 
Kyle A. Brown* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Scalia calls American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, 
Inc. “the latest skirmish in the long-running copyright battle over the 
delivery of television programming,”1 but this skirmish may have 
warlike consequences.  The United States Constitution gives Congress 
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”2  This 
constitutional language suggests that the Framers intended that 
consumers be the ultimate beneficiaries of the intellectual property 
system.  The Intellectual Property Clause is not meant to give the 
wealthiest broadcasters a steel grip over competition and new 
technology, but rather to promote the progress of science. 
Pursuant to this power, Congress passed the Copyright Act of 
1976, which gives a copyright owner certain enumerated rights in his 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Emory 
University.  Special thanks to Professor Gaia Bernstein and Isabelle Fabian for their 
guidance throughout the writing of this Comment. 
 1  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting).  
 2  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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work.3  At issue in the Aereo case4 is the right to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly.5  Aereo was a start-up business that provided access to 
basic cable by capturing and streaming free, over-the-air broadcasts6 on 
the Internet.  The company spent time and money to ensure that its 
system fit squarely within a loophole in the current Copyright Act as 
determined by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.7  Aereo sought to 
change the way that we watch local television, to break the iron grip 
that cable companies have over all of us, and to keep more of our hard-
earned cash in our pockets instead of the giant cable companies’.8  
Today, cable systems generally use a scheme of channel bundling as 
opposed to allowing customers to purchase only the channels that they 
watch, meaning customers are forced to pay for channels that they 
never use in order to get the few that they want.  Aereo charged eight 
dollars per month for its streaming service;9 the current price for the 
most basic television package from major cable systems is at least twice 
Aereo’s cost with one cable company charging as much as sixty-five 
 
 3  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2014) (listing the six exclusive rights of the copyright owner 
as the rights: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by renting, leasing, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, 
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound 
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission). 
 4  Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2498. 
 5  17 U.S.C. § 106(4).   
 6  See Chloe Albanesius & Jamie Lendino, Aereo: Everything You Need to Know, 
PCMAG (Apr. 22, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2417 
555,00.asp (explaining that major broadcasters like CBS, ABC, NBC, FOX, the CW, 
and PBS are all available with an Aereo subscription, but pay TV, like HBO or SyFy, is 
not available.  Aereo only gives users access to programming that they can already 
access for free in their homes by using an antenna and a digital HDTV tuner).  
 7  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 395 (S.D.N.Y 
2012) (“Aereo has made substantial investments of money and human capital in its 
system, all in reliance on the assumption that the Second Circuit meant what it said in 
Cablevision rather than what it did not say.”), aff’d, 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 8  Ted Kritsonis, Aereo’s CEO Wants to Turn TV on its Head (And Big Media Wants His 
Head), DIGITAL TRENDS (July 20, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/home-
theater/aereos-ceo-wants-to-turn-tv-on-its-head-and-big-media-wants-his-head/. 
 9  Jon Skillings, Aereo Fine-Tunes its TV Streaming Prices, Plans, CNET (May 13, 2013, 
5:52 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/aereo-fine-tunes-its-tv-streaming-prices-plans/. 
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dollars per month for basic cable.10 
Unfortunately, Aereo must be referred to in the past tense 
following the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision.  Because the Court 
declared Aereo’s service illegal, the company decided to cease 
operations and eventually declared bankruptcy in late 2014.11  Aereo 
was not the only company impacted by the Court’s decision; in fact, 
companies and individuals across the country will have to change 
business models, products, and services because the Court eliminated 
any need for volitional conduct in order to find direct copyright 
infringement.  In addition to eliminating the most significant element 
required to prove direct copyright infringement, the Court also 
created a double standard for so-called “cable systems” that lowers the 
bar for finding direct infringement in cases where the looks-like-cable-
TV standard applies.  Aside from putting Aereo out of business, the 
Court’s decision threatens advancements in Internet streaming 
technology and forces the American people to pay exorbitant 
subscription prices to cable companies that, for the most part, operate 
with the bottom line prioritized over the customer. 
Part II of this Comment provides the reader with background 
information on the cable industry and sets the scene for Aereo’s entry 
into this highly competitive business.  Part III provides a description of 
Aereo’s technology, including the trial court’s factual findings, which 
were conceded throughout the appellate proceedings.  Part IV 
considers the history of the Copyright Act and analyzes the relevant 
case law providing a foundation for the Aereo decision.  Part V of this 
Comment examines the Supreme Court’s decision and its effect on 
copyright law.  Part VI explores the implications of the Court’s 
decision, investigates how the Court may have produced unintended 
consequences with its ruling, and argues that the Court, while 
attempting to limit the decision to cable television lookalikes, in fact 
eliminated the traditional volitional conduct requirement.  The 
 
10   See Shop, XFINITY SHOP, http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Learn/ 
DigitalCable/Digitalcable.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (listing the “Limited 
Basic” plan at $20 per month); Digital Cable TV Plans & Packages, TIME WARNER CABLE, 
https://www.timewarnercable.com/en/plans-packages/tv/digital-cable-tv-plans.html 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (listing the “Starter TV” package at $19.99 per month); 
Optimum TV: Better Television, OPTIMUM, http://www.optimum.com/digital-cable-
tv/pricing.jsp (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (listing the “Optimum Value” plan for $64.95 
per month); Fios TV, VERIZON, http://www.verizon.com/home/fiostv/ (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2015) (listing the “FiOS TV Local” plan for $10 per month). 
11  Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/business/aereo-files-for-bankruptcy. 
html?_r=0.   
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Court’s decision had this consequence because the majority ventured 
too far beyond the text of the Copyright Act to rule against Aereo; this 
part also argues that the Court should have followed historic patterns 
and let the legislature amend the Copyright Act to respond to 
technological advancements that fill loopholes in current copyright 
law.  Part VII concludes. 
II. WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE: HOW THE BROADCAST AND CABLE 
INDUSTRIES WORK TOGETHER 
In order to fully appreciate the landscape surrounding this case, 
it is important to understand how the broadcast business works and 
why a technology like Aereo’s is frightening for major broadcast 
television companies.  Like many American battles, this is not a fight 
over what is morally right or what is best for the public; this is a fight 
over money.  Broadcasters make the majority of their money from 
three sources: advertising, compulsory licensing fees, and 
retransmission fees.12  Advertising revenue was not an issue in this case 
primarily because Nielsen13 had made a change in its procedures to 
bring Aereo viewers into the rating equation.14  Compulsory licensing 
fees were also not the main issue in this battle.  Those fees are 
established in § 111 of the Copyright Act, which provides that cable 
systems, at a maximum, may have to pay up to approximately three 
percent of gross receipts in royalty fees to the broadcasters.15 
The main issue in this battle was the fact that Aereo did not pay 
any retransmission fees to the broadcasters who brought the lawsuit.  
Why are these fees the most important part of this battle?  Because, 
unlike compulsory licensing fees, retransmission fees are not 
statutorily regulated in amount; instead, they must be negotiated in 
good faith.16  These fees are established by the 1992 Cable Act,17 which 
 
12  See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2014); Miriam Gottfried, Network Fees Create Drama for 
Broadcasters, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/network-fees-
create-drama-for-broadcasters-heard-on-the-street-1411331884. 
13  Nielsen Company provides a “Nielsen rating” for each program on television, 
which measures the size and composition of the audience for the program.  That data 
is then used to calculate the rate for a commercial spot during the particular program.  
About Us, http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/about-us.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). 
14  Brian Stelter, Nielsen Adjusts Its Rating to Add Web-Linked TVs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
21, 2013), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/tvs-connected-to-
the-internet-to-be-counted-by-nielsen/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
15  17 U.S.C. § 111(d).  
16  47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C) (2014). 
17  See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-385 (1992); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.55–62 (2014) (implementing cable must-
BROWN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/4/2015  11:48 AM 
2015] COMMENT  247 
provides commercial broadcasters, every three years, with two options.  
First, broadcasters may elect the “must carry” provision requiring all 
cable systems in the area to carry their programming.18  Importantly, 
broadcasters do not get paid retransmission fees if they select this 
option.19  The second, more popular option allows broadcasters to 
renegotiate their contracts with cable systems every three years,20 which 
is where the real money is made.21 
Retransmission fees provide broadcasters with a massive amount 
of leverage that leaves cable companies in an undesirable position.  If 
cable providers negotiate too hard for their customers, their customers 
end up losing access to desired programming; if cable providers do not 
fight hard enough, however, their customers must pay incredibly high 
prices for access to broadcast television that the public has a right to 
receive for free over the air.  For example, Time Warner Cable 
subscribers in Corpus Christi, Texas lost access to their local NBC 
affiliate for nearly five months and missed out on the Super Bowl in 
2012 because the broadcaster and Time Warner could not reach an 
agreement.22  That demonstration of power followed one in 2010 when 
FOX banned Cablevision from showing games one and two of the 
World Series to Cablevision subscribers.23  Broadcasters use their 
superior bargaining power to leverage cable companies into paying 
high retransmission fees, which ultimately result in pass-through 
charges to consumers ranging anywhere from one to five dollars per 
 
carry); 47 C.F.R. § 76.64 (2014) (implementing cable retransmission consent). 
18  See 47 C.F.R. § 76.55–62 (implementing cable must-carry).  
19  See JEFFERY A. EISENACH, PH.D., DELIVERING FOR TELEVISION VIEWERS: 
RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND THE U.S. MARKET FOR VIDEO CONTENT 5 (2014), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2014/PUB_Retransmission
_Consent_0714.pdf. 
20  See id. 
21  See Kevin Hunt, Kevin Hunt: What Is $1.50 ‘Broadcast TV Fee’ On Cable Bill? (It’s 
Worth Billions), HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://cached.newslookup.com/cached.php?ref_id=510&siteid=2420&id=5855178&
t=1398723072 (“Broadcasters get $3 billion a year in retransmission fees from cable 
and satellite providers, according to research firm SNL Kagan.”); Roger Yu, 
Retransmission Fee Race Poses Questions for TV Viewers, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/14/tv-retrans-
fees/2512233/ (describing retransmission fees as expected “to more than double from 
$2.36 billion in 2012 to $6.05 billion—about 23% of total TV station revenue—by 2018, 
according to industry research firm SNL Kagan.”  And reporting, “The stakes are high: 
At Nexstar, retrans revenue rose 64.2% to $23.8 million in the first quarter this year, 
outpacing the more modest 32.6% growth in advertising.  Other broadcasters report 
similarly increasing rates.”). 
22  Yu, supra note 21. 
23  Hunt, supra note 21. 
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month.24 
In addition to traditional cable companies, broadcasters exert 
their iron grip on satellite companies like DirecTV, which reported 
that its retransmission fee rates went up eight percent in the latest 
round of negotiations.25  Of course, neither satellite nor traditional 
cable systems can realistically refuse to reach an agreement with any 
major broadcaster because failure to carry a major network will result 
in massive customer losses for the provider.  With no way for cable 
systems to fight back, broadcasters are free to demand exorbitant 
retransmission fees to the American people’s detriment.26 
Essentially, this is a fight over how the American people can 
receive copyrighted works broadcast over frequencies that we, in fact, 
own.  Undisputedly, you have a right to set up an antenna, a TV, a DVR, 
and a Slingbox,27 which together would give you your own version of 
Aereo right in your home.  The plaintiffs in this case urge the Court to 
expand broadcaster copyright protections beyond the scope of the 
Copyright Act’s text in order to provide themselves with a monopoly 
over the methods that deliver their programs to the consumer.  The 
unpopularity of the current regime is evidenced by HBO’s recent 
announcement that it will “offer a stand-alone streaming service 
directly to Internet customers beginning [in 2015], taking a giant step 
toward breaking the pay-TV bundle that has been a cornerstone of the 
television industry for more than a quarter-century.”28 
Finally, not all broadcasters oppose Aereo; in fact, it is only the 
largest, wealthiest few who have filed suit.  An amicus brief in the case, 
filed by a group of small and independent broadcasters (“SIBs”), 
revealed the damaging effects a decision against Aereo would have on 
 
24  See id. 
25  Id. 
26  See Yu, supra note 21 (“CBS is seeking to roughly double its retrans fee total to 
about $500 million this year.”).  
27  See SLINGBOX, http://www.slingbox.com/DiscoverSling.aspx (last visited Sept. 
23, 2015).  A Slingbox enables a person to watch programming from his cable 
subscription on any Internet connected device.  The Slingbox connects to the user’s 
cablebox and allows access to all the channels to which the user is subscribed and to 
the user’s DVR.  This allows a user to pay for only one cablebox and have access to the 
programming on other televisions within the home and on any Internet connected 
device on the go, and even allows access via the Internet while the user is traveling 
internationally.   
28  Meg James, HBO Going ‘Over the Top’ with Internet Streaming Service in 2015, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/ 
cotown/la-et-ct-hbo-to-launch-internet-only-service-20141015-story.html.  
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their businesses.29  SIBs provide content that is not available on the 
major networks; for example, Cocola Broadcasting, a Fresno-based 
broadcaster, provides Hmong-language programming to the sizable 
Hmong population there, which has been completely ignored by 
major broadcasters.30  Technology like Aereo’s would provide those 
individuals with a cheap service allowing access to vital news and 
information in their native language. 
Another benefit of Aereo’s service was that it would have allowed 
SIBs to expand viewership in their respective markets.  For example, 
“once Aereo became available in Cincinnati, Ohio, small broadcaster 
WKRP began actively promoting the use of Aereo to expand viewership 
and increase interest among viewers who were otherwise unable to 
receive WKRP’s signal clearly.”31  Large broadcasters do not want to 
lose market share to these SIBs who provide diverse content to local 
communities.  According to the amici SIBs, broadcasters “have 
accepted a basic bargain: In return for their right to broadcast freely 
over the public airwaves, consumers have the reciprocal right to use an 
antenna to access their over-the-air broadcasts, and to make personal 
recordings of the broadcast programs without license or payment.”32  
SIBs contend that large broadcasters have “reneged on this bargain,”33 
and that in order to increase their own power and wealth, those large 
networks believe that “they are entitled to control how and when 
individual audience members tune the antennas that receive their 
transmissions for private recording and viewing.”34 
The Court’s decision hurts Aereo as a business, but the biggest 
loss is borne by the American people who have lost a valuable 
technological advancement, have been stripped of the opportunity for 
a more free-flowing exchange of ideas, and have been forced into the 
chokehold of cable companies who are free to charge shocking prices, 
since their only competition has just been deemed illegal.  The Court’s 
decision miscalculates the proper balance that the Framers intended 
to achieve with the Intellectual Property Clause; the decision 
overemphasizes the protections afforded by the Copyright Act and 
undervalues the fact that Congress is instructed “to promote the 
 
29  Brief of Amici Curiae Small and Independent Broadcasters in Support of 
Respondent, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 
WL 1319385. 
30  Id. at 5–6.  
31  Id. at 6–7.  
32  Id. at 8. 
33  Id. 
34  Id.   
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progress of science and useful arts,”35 not to promote the self-interests of a 
few large, powerful broadcasting companies. 
III. PARADISE CITY: AEREO’S INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Aereo designed its technology platform with the Cablevision36 
decision in mind, intending to utilize the four guideposts set out in 
that case to ensure that its business would be in compliance with the 
Second Circuit’s view of the Copyright Act’s Transmit Clause.37  
“Aereo’s system allows users to access free, over-the-air broadcast 
television through antennas and hard disks located at Aereo’s 
facilities.”38  Subscribers may use any Internet-connected device 
including, but not limited to, televisions, computers, tablets, or smart 
phones to stream their selected program online.39  Aereo users have 
the choice to either “Watch” or “Record” the programming that they 
desire to view.40  While the initial choice may make a difference in the 
retention of the video file after playback is complete, any meaningful 
distinction is eliminated by the fact that users who initially select 
“Watch” may, during viewing, select to “Record,” and users who 
initially record may start to watch before the program has completely 
aired.41  Therefore, from the user’s perspective, Aereo operates 
similarly to a DVR that has been connected to a Slingbox,42 or 
equivalent technology, which allows a user to stream data from his DVR 
to his Internet-connected device.43 
Behind the scenes, Aereo’s system is inert until a user-generated 
request springs the system into action.44  By clicking “Watch” or 
 
35  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
36  Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
37  See WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir. 2013), 
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (discussing each of the four guideposts gleaned from the 
Cablevision decision.  First, “the Transmit Clause directs courts to consider the potential 
audience of the individual transmission.” Second, private transmissions should not be 
aggregated.  “Third, there is an exception to this no-aggregation rule when private 
transmissions are generated from the same copy of the work.”  Finally, any factor 
limiting the potential audience of a particular transmission is relevant to the Transmit 
Clause analysis.). 
38  Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).   
39  Id. at 377. 
40   Id. 
41   Id. 
42   See SLINGBOX, supra note 27. 
43   Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
44   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2518 (2014). 
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“Record,” the user sends a signal to the Aereo system, which tunes a 
specific antenna to the frequency corresponding to the program the 
user wants to watch.45  The data collected by the antenna is passed 
through a transcoder, which creates a digital file of the program that 
is stored in a directory unique to the user.46  The system then waits 
approximately seven seconds, while a portion of the program is saved 
to the user’s directory, before beginning playback.47  Both the antenna 
capturing the free, over-the-air broadcast, and the file subsequently 
created are unique to the user.  At any given time, an antenna may 
either be inert or in use by a maximum of one user.48  Additionally, 
each file saved to Aereo’s system is accessible only by the user who 
created it.49 
Assignments of antennas to users occur based upon the user’s 
subscription type, with the majority of users opting for the “dynamic” 
configuration over the “static” plan.50  A dynamic user is assigned an 
antenna randomly and becomes the sole user of that antenna for the 
duration of the program.51  After the program has aired, the antenna 
has finished its job and is then free to be assigned to another user at a 
later time.52  In comparison, static users have a set of antennas 
previously assigned to them.  Every time a static user watches or records 
a program, he is guaranteed that the antenna capturing the signal will 
be one of his previously assigned antennas.53 
The only factual dispute in the trial court was whether the 
antennas housed in Aereo’s warehouse operated independently or 
collectively as a unit.54  Plaintiffs claimed that the antennas operated 
collectively, while Aereo contended that each antenna operated 
independently.55  The antennas consist of a pair of dime-sized metal 
loops.56  Eighty antennas are present on each circuit board with a metal 
rail that separates the antennas from the electrical components used 
 
45   Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78. 
46   Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 2013). 
47   Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
48   Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 683. 
49   Id. 
50   Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78.  
51   Id. at 378. 
52   Id. 
53   Id. 
54   Id. 
55   Id. 
56   Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 379. 
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to operate the antennas.57  Each housing contains a parallel 
configuration of sixteen circuit boards.58 
Each party presented expert testimony at trial regarding the 
collective or independent nature of the antennas.59  After reviewing all 
of the evidence, the trial court “[found] that Aereo’s antennas 
function independently.”60  The plaintiffs did not challenge that 
finding on appeal; thus, the fact that each antenna operates 
individually is undisputed for the purpose of appellate review.61 
In summary, “Aereo’s system creates a subscriber-specific 
copythat is, a ‘personal’ copyof the subscriber’s program of 
choice,” which is stored in a subscriber-specific folder and streamed 
over the Internet directly to the subscriber’s Internet-connected 
device.62 
IV. YOU AIN’T THE FIRST: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 
1976 
The Statute of Anne, promulgated in 1710, is considered the first 
modern copyright statute because it was the first time that authors 
received rights in their respective works.63  Copyright law in the United 
States has existed since colonial times, with the first federal copyright 
laws coming shortly after the ratification of the Constitution.64  The 
modern Copyright Act has been interpreted and revised a number of 
times since its origination.  It is that pattern of interpretation by the 
Court and revision by the legislature that is relevant here. 
A. The Fortnightly and Teleprompter Cases 
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., the Court 
considered the copyright liability of a community antenna television 
(“CATV”) system.65  The CATV provider installed antennas on the tops 
of hills surrounding two cities and used amplifying technology to send 
the signals via coaxial cable to its subscribers.66  The CATV system 
 
57   Id. 
58   Id. 
59   Id. at 380–81. 
60   Id. at 381. 
61   Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013).  
62   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2502–03 (2014). 
63   CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 17 (9th ed. 2013). 
64   Id. at 20–21. 
65   Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
66   Id. at 391–92.  
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constantly transmitted a television signal to its subscribers; a subscriber 
only had to switch on his TV and turn to any of the five programs that 
were being transmitted at a given time.67  Each subscriber would receive 
the same programming at the same time, which included only 
unedited transmissions of the original broadcasts.68 
A copyright owner challenged the CATV system as an 
infringement of his right to publicly perform his work.69  The United 
States Supreme Court, interpreting the Copyright Act of 1909, held 
that broadcasters performed, but viewers did not perform.70  The 1909 
Act did not contain a specific definition of “perform” and did not 
contain the Transmit Clause found in the current version of the Act.  
Instead, the Court found that “resolution of the issue . . . depend[ed] 
upon a determination of the function that CATV plays in the total 
process of television broadcasting and reception.”71  After drawing this 
line, the Court concluded that a CATV provider was more akin to a 
viewer than a broadcaster, and as such, it was incapable of performing 
and therefore, incapable of infringing the copyright holder’s public 
performance right.72  According to the Court, “a CATV system no more 
than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s 
signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient connection 
to the viewer’s television set.”73 
What is crucial to note about the Fortnightly decision is not what 
the Court ultimately held, but rather what the Court refrained from 
doing in its decision.  The Court explicitly noted that it had been 
presented with a difficult task in “read[ing] the statutory language of 
60 years ago in the light of drastic technological change.”74  Instead of 
letting the pressures of outside commentators and officials interfere 
with the Court’s duty to apply the law, the Justices reached a conclusion 
in line with the law as written and not the law as it should have been 
updated to reflect the changes in technology made between 1909 and 
the 1960s.  Justice Stewart, in concluding the majority opinion, noted 
that the Court had “been invited by the Solicitor General . . . [to] 
accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, 
 
67   Id. at 392. 
68   Id. 
69   Id. at 394.   
70   Id. at 398.   
71   Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 397. 
72   Id. at 399. 
73   Id. 
74   Id. at 396. 
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communications, and antitrust policy.”75  Wisely, the Court “decline[d] 
the invitation,” stating, “[t]hat job is for Congress.”76  Instead, the 
Court applied the Copyright Act of 1909 as written to hold that the 
CATV providers did not “perform” the copyrighted works under the 
Act.77 
Six years after the Fortnightly decision, the Court granted certiorari 
in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., which involved 
a CATV system similar to that at issue in Fortnightly.78  Teleprompter’s 
technologies were essentially the same as those employed by 
Fortnightly, but as can be expected, in the six years between these 
cases, technology improved.  Teleprompter’s system was capable of 
delivering broadcast programming originating a distance of more than 
450 miles away from the subscriber,79 whereas the Fortnightly case dealt 
with systems carrying signals for 52–82 miles.80 
The plaintiffs in Teleprompter attempted to distinguish their CATV 
system from the Fortnightly system, noting that even if an individual 
subscriber owned his own antenna, the curvature of the earth would 
make it impossible for him to receive a signal from such a great 
distance.81  The crux of the argument was that CATV providers, who 
offered a service that an individual viewer could not provide for 
himself, did not fall on the viewer’s side of the line82 drawn in 
Fortnightly.83 
The Court then quickly addressed some of the underlying 
concerns presented in the case, including the CATV system’s effect on 
the relationship between advertisers and broadcasters, calling the 
“reallocation of the potential number of viewers each station may 
reach, a fact of no direct concern under the Copyright Act.”84  
Ultimately, the Court found the alleged distinctions unconvincing and 
followed precedent established in Fortnightly to again “hold that CATV 
operators, like viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not perform the 
programs that they receive and carry.”85 
 
75   Id. at 401. 
76   Id.   
77   Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 401–02. 
78   Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
79   Id. at 400. 
80   Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392. 
81   Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 400. 
82   Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–99. 
83   Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 401–02. 
84   Id. at 413.  
85   Id. at 404 (citing Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400–01). 
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Although the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act negated the 
Teleprompter Court’s interpretation of “perform,” the Court’s deference 
to the plain meaning of the statutory language remains important.  
The Court noted that “[s]hifts in current business and commercial 
relationships, while of significance with respect to the organization and 
growth of the communications industry, simply cannot be controlled 
by means of litigation based on copyright legislation enacted more 
than half a century ago, when neither broadcast television nor CATV 
was yet conceived.”86  The Court again wisely refrained from rewriting 
the decades-old Copyright Act even though there was a sense that the 
Justices were indeed hoping that the Fortnightly decision would invite 
Congress to review the Act.  Instead of violating traditional notions of 
separation of powers, Justice Stewart gave the legislature another 
reminder that “[d]etailed regulation of these relationships, and any 
ultimate resolution of the many sensitive and important problems in 
this field, must be left to Congress.”87 
B. The 1976 Revision of the Copyright Act 
The 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act were, in large part, a 
legislative response to the Court’s holdings in Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter.88  The Justices had called for this action at the end of both 
opinions in an effort to maintain the proper balance between the 
judiciary and legislature.  In response, the 1976 Copyright Act 
contained three significant changes that expressly rejected the Court’s 
finding that CATV providers did not perform. 
First, Congress provided that “to ‘perform’ an audiovisual work 
means ‘to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds 
accompanying it audible.’”89  Second, Congress enacted the Transmit 
Clause, which was wholly absent from the 1909 Act, and which provides 
that an entity performs publicly where it “communicates [a 
performance] by any device or process whereby images or sounds are 
received beyond the place from which they are sent.”90  Finally, 
Congress enacted § 111, which “creates a complex, highly detailed 
compulsory licensing scheme that sets out the conditions, including 
the payment of compulsory fees, under which cable systems may 
 
86   Id. at 414. 
87   Id.  
88   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505 (2014). 
89   Id. at 2505–06 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014)).   
90   Id. at 2506 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86–87 (1976); 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
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retransmit broadcasts.”91  In the Aereo opinion, Justice Breyer 
concluded that Congress made these three changes “to bring the 
activities of cable systems within the scope of the Copyright Act.”92 
C. Sony: Volitional Conduct and “Time-Shifting” 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. involved the 
invention of the Betamax VTR (predecessor to the once-popular 
VCR), which allowed customers to record copyrighted programs 
primarily for the purpose of watching the program at a later time, a 
process Sony labeled “time-shifting.”93  In Sony, the Court held that in 
order to be liable for direct infringement, the actor must “personally 
engage[] in infringing conduct.”94  The Court established that the 
concept of contributory infringement in copyright comes not from a 
copyright statute, but rather from the Patent Act and the common law 
concept of vicarious liability.95  Therefore, in order to be found liable 
for contributory infringement, there must be some legal relationship 
or other affirmative actlike providing the copyrighted work to be 
infringed96in order for a third party to be liable for the infringer’s 
conduct.  The Court then went on to hold that “time-shifting” was a 
non-infringing fair use,97 meaning the Betamax had significant non-
infringing uses and that Sony was not liable for contributory 
infringement.98  Aereo’s appeal only addressed the “Watch” streaming 
feature, but if a hypothetical company were to offer subscribers only 
the “Record” portion of Aereo’s model, Sony may provide a way around 
the Aereo decision.99 
 
91   Id. at 2506 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88). 
92   Id. at 2506. 
93   Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).  
94   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 433). 
95   Sony, 464 U.S. at 434–35 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2014); Kalem Co. v. Harper 
Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)). 
96   Id. at 434–37. 
97   Id. at 454–55. 
98   Id. at 455–56. 
99 The argument would be that while Aereo provided a service similar to CATV 
systems by delivering essentially live TV, this hypothetical record-only Aereo would be 
more akin to the Betamax VTR.  It would only be able to record programing for later 
viewing after the program has aired, just like an old VCR.  If the Court were to apply a 
black-box analysis, like the analysis applied in Aereo III, infra Part VI.B, the basic input 
and output for the recordings would be almost identical to those in Sony.  The user 
initiates the recording by pressing or clicking a button, some magic happens, and then 
after the program airs, the recording is available.  It should not matter that the 
hardware is located in a warehouse instead of a user’s home; if the end result is that 
the user is viewing the program in a private manner, then that is fair use.  No infringing 
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While Sony remains important for its holdings regarding the line 
between fair use and copyright infringement and affirming the 
volitional conduct requirement, the case also provides dicta regarding 
the proper role of the Court and of Congress in copyright matters.  The 
Sony Court pointed out the historic roles of the judiciary and the 
legislature in the United States, noting that “[r]epeatedly, as new 
developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress 
that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made 
necessary.”100  This pattern of technological advances followed by 
amendments to the copyright law was broken in Aereo III when the 
Court reached beyond the scope of the Copyright Act’s text to include 
a new technologyInternet streamingunder laws that the Court 
recognized were intended to deal specifically with cable television 
systems.  In addition, the Sony Court explicitly mentions the limitations 
of judicial power, saying: “It may well be that Congress will take a fresh 
look at this new technology, just as it so often has examined other 
innovations in the past.  But it is not our job to apply laws that have not 
yet been written.”101 
Thus, the Sony decision is important not only because it held that 
direct infringement requires some personally infringing conduct, 
known as the volitional conduct requirement, but also because it 
reinforced the Court’s pattern of refraining from going beyond the 
text of the Copyright Act applicable to the suit and leaving the 
legislature to do its job in amending or revising the statute. 
D. The Second Circuit’s Particular Transmission Approach 
In Cablevision, the Second Circuit dealt with a case involving 
Cablevision’s use of remote storage DVR (“RS-DVR”) technology to 
allow customers without set-top DVRs to record programs at a “remote” 
location.102  A number of copyright owners brought suit claiming that 
Cablevision’s failure to obtain licenses to operate or sell the RS-DVR 
resulted in direct infringement of their exclusive right to reproduce 
and publicly perform the copyrighted works.103 
The RS-DVR system worked in a manner similar to the Aereo 
system, but with two major differences.  First, instead of capturing a 
program once for each user, Cablevision’s system used a single 
 
conduct by the user means no infringement to which Aereo-record-only can 
contribute. 
100   Sony, 464 U.S. at 430–31. 
101   Id. at 456.  
102   Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008).   
103   Id. at 124. 
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stream104 of incoming data to produce a copy of the program for each 
user.105  What that means is that Cablevision used the single stream of 
data, for which it had a license, and made a copy of that entire stream 
to send through the Broadband Media Router (“BMR”)106 and then 
through a primary ingest buffer107 to be processed.108  Second, 
Cablevision initially buffered every incoming program to prepare it for 
saving on a hard disk regardless of whether a customer had actually 
requested the recording of that program.109 
The Cablevision court analyzed the plaintiff’s claim that 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR would infringe its right to publicly perform the 
copyrighted works under the Transmit Clause.110  The district court 
looked to the potential audience for an underlying work, which, as the 
Second Circuit noted, is the public in each and every imaginable case, 
rendering every transmission of a copyrighted work “to the public” 
regardless of the number of people actually capable of receiving the 
specific transmission.111  This approach, looking to the potential 
audience for an underlying work instead of a specific transmission, is 
 
104   See id.  Each “copy” received by any Cablevision user was the product of the 
same underlying data stream, whereas each Aereo user received a “copy” that was 
produced by a different antenna and transcoder than every other user’s copy.  
Therefore, each Cablevision customer received a copy of the exact same data, which 
came from the split stream through the buffers, while each Aereo customer had a copy 
of different data.  Hypothetically, if there was interference with some, but not all, of 
Aereo’s antennas, it was possible for two Aereo users who chose to record the same 
program at the same time to end up with different data since each “copy” was 
produced wholly independently of each other “copy” of the same programming. 
105   Id. at 124–25. 
106   Id. (stating that the BMR is used to reformat incoming data into a data stream 
that can be utilized by the primary ingest buffer.  The BMR is used constantly, 
regardless of whether any user has made a request to record the programming, and 
holds up to 1.2 seconds of programming at any given time). 
107   Id. (stating that the primary ingest buffer’s job is to hold the entire stream of 
data coming from the BMR for a split second while the system determines if any 
customers have requested to record the programming in the buffer.  If there has been 
a request made that data is sent to a secondary buffer, which in turn creates a copy of 
the programming on a hard disk in a directory allocated specifically to the user.  The 
primary ingest buffer is constantly operational and holds no more than a tenth of a 
second of each channel’s programming at any given time). 
108   Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124–25.   
109   Id.  See also supra notes 106 & 107 for a brief discussion of the main buffers 
used regardless of whether there had been a user request for the data.  It could be 
argued here that Cablevision chooses to record every program and their customers 
only choose to not stop the recording and get a personal copy, though this seems like 
a negligible distinction given the transitory nature of the initial recording.  
110   Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 134.   
111   Id. at 135–36.   
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called the “aggregate audience approach” within this Comment. 
The Second Circuit found the lower court’s reading of the 
Transmit Clause incorrect because of the implications of that reading 
on current technology.  Following the lower court’s reasoning would 
mean that if HBO transmitted a copyrighted work to Cablevision and 
Comcast, then Cablevision retransmitted that work from one 
Cablevision facility to another without transmitting it to any customers 
while Comcast transmits the program to its customers, then 
Cablevision would be publicly performing solely because of the acts of 
Comcast.112  Clearly, this result is illogical.  Additionally, the Second 
Circuit pointed to the unfortunate and irrational impact of such an 
interpretation on individual consumers.  Under the aggregate 
audience approach, “a hapless customer who records a program in his 
den and later transmits the recording to a television in his bedroom 
would be liable for publicly performing the work simply because some 
other party had once transmitted the same underlying performance to 
the public.”113  This is undoubtedly a scary and unsustainable 
interpretation for any consumer who owns a multi-room DVR. 
The Second Circuit, in rejecting the district court’s reasoning, 
looked to the statutory language of the Transmit Clause, and its 
legislative history, to conclude that the RS-DVR system at issue made 
only private performances, noting that each “transmission of a 
performance is itself a performance.”114  The Second Circuit 
determined that the question to be answered in the face of a Transmit 
Clause issue is “who precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a particular 
transmission of a performance.”115  Answering this question, in 
Cablevision, the court concluded that only the particular customer who 
requested the recording was capable of receiving the transmission at 
issue, rendering the performance, or the transmission, not “to the 
public” under the Copyright Act.116 
Because the Second Circuit recognizes each transmission as a 
distinct performance, the main issue is whether the individuals capable 
of receiving a particular transmission constitute “the public.”  
Historically, the Second Circuit’s approach fits with the CATV cases 
because in those cases, the particular transmissions at issue originated 
from a single antenna.  That single transmission was carried through 
 
112   Id. at 136.   
113   Id.   
114   Id. at 134.   
115   Id. at 135.   
116   Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138. 
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coaxial cables to provide every subscriber with the exact same 
programming at the exact same time from the exact same device; thus, 
the audience for the particular transmission constituted “the public.”  
This approach therefore gives credence to the legislative changes 
incorporated into the 1976 Act to bring CATV systems within its reach, 
while staying true to the Act’s text and refraining from artificially 
enlarging the scope of copyright protection beyond that which the 
legislature has guaranteed. 
V. GET IN THE RING: AEREO GOES TO THE SUPREME COURT 
A. The Lower Court Decisions 
The appeal presented to the Supreme Court stemmed from a 
motion filed in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in 2012 to enjoin Aereo “from engaging in those 
aspects of its service that allow its users to access ‘live’ copyrighted 
content over the internet.”117  As the trial court noted, “the issue . . . is 
quite limited.”118  The issue is limited in two respects: (1) “Plaintiffs 
moved for a preliminary injunction, asserting that Aereo was directly 
liable for copyright infringement by publicly performing Plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works[,]”119 and (2) the “motion was further limited in 
scope, challenging only the aspects of Aereo’s service that allow 
subscribers to view Plaintiffs’ copyrighted television programs 
contemporaneously with the over-the-air broadcast of these 
programs.”120 
Although the district court entered a lengthy opinion in the case, 
the ultimate disposition is easily summarized in two sentences: “But for 
Cablevision’s express holding regarding the meaning of the provision 
of the Copyright Act in issue here—the transmit clause—Plaintiffs 
would likely prevail on their request for a preliminary injunction.  
However, in light of that decision, this Court concludes that it is bound 
to DENY Plaintiffs’ request.”121 
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the trial court’s 
decision and affirmed the order denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction.122  The circuit court’s opinion sheds some light 
 
117   Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
118   Id. at 376. 
119   Id. (emphasis added).  
120   Id.  
121   Id. at 375.  
122   Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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on why Aereo’s system falls beyond the reach of the Copyright Act.  
First, and most importantly, in the Second Circuit, “technical 
architecture matters.”123  This is significant because the Second Circuit 
does not reason by analogy or resemblance; instead, the court actually 
looks at the technical functionality of a system to determine whether 
the system performs publicly or privately.124 
Second, the court recognizes that the legislative intent of the 1976 
Copyright Act requires the court to determine whether a transmission 
is made to the public.125  The court specifically rejects the aggregate 
audience approach, which makes all transmissions public, noting that 
“if Congress intended all transmissions to be public performances, the 
Transmit Clause would not have contained the phrase ‘to the 
public.’”126 
The Second Circuit ultimately rested its conclusion on the 
Cablevision decision, which is circuit precedent, holding that, “Aereo’s 
transmissions of unique copies of broadcast television programs 
created at its users’ requests and transmitted while the programs are 
still airing on broadcast television are not ‘public performances’ of the 
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works under Cablevision.”127  Thus, the issue 
presented to the Supreme Court for review was a limited one: an 
appeal from the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction against 
Aereo alleging direct copyright infringement for only the “Watch” 
portion of Aereo’s service, which allows users to contemporaneously 
view broadcast programs on Aereo’s system while those programs are 
being aired.128 
B. The Majority’s Opinion 
Petitioners in this case, television broadcasters who own 
copyrights in many of the programs that Aereo streams to subscribers, 
argued “that Aereo was infringing their right to ‘perform’ their works 
‘publicly,’ as the Transmit Clause defines those terms.”129  The majority 
recognized two distinct questions to be answered in this case.  First, 
 
123   Id. at 694. 
124   Id. at 695 (“[U]nanticipated technological developments have created tension 
between Congress’s view that retransmissions of network programs by cable television 
systems should be deemed public performances and its intent that some transmissions 
be classified as private.”).  
125   Id. at 694. 
126   Id. (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
127   Id. at 696. 
128   See supra text accompanying notes 119 & 120.   
129   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503–04 (2014). 
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does Aereo “perform”?  And second, if it does, is that performance 
“public”?130 
In answering the first question, the Court engaged in what the 
dissent called a “looks-like-cable-TV” analysis.131  The majority 
proceeded to engage in a historical analysis of the Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter cases, and the 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act that 
effectively overruled those cases.132  The Court needed to engage in this 
analysis because the rest of the majority opinion was fashioned through 
analogies to CATV providers of the 1960s.  First, the Court stated the 
universally accepted fact that Congress made the 1976 amendments to 
the Copyright Act “to bring the activities of cable systems within the 
scope of the Copyright Act.”133 
Then, although the majority recognized some differences in 
technology between CATV and Aereo, noting that CATV systems 
“transmitted constantly” whereas Aereo’s system is “inert until a 
subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program,” the Court 
determined that the technological differences did not merit a 
substantive discussion.134  In fact, one of the biggest differences in 
technology between the 1960s and today is the Internet, which in the 
1960s was completely undiscovered, but is part of our everyday lives 
today.  The majority acknowledged that the Internet plays a large role 
in Aereo’s system, but concluded that “this difference means 
nothing.”135 
After disregarding most technological differences between the 
CATV providers of the 1960s and Aereo’s current technology using 
small antennas, transcoders, Internet-connected servers, and a web-
based mobile interface,136 the Court then analogized Aereo’s system to 
that of CATV providers from the 1960s to affirmatively answer the 
question of whether Aereo performs.  The majority accepted the 
difference between Aereo’s inert system and the constant 
transmissions of CATV systems, but concluded that “the many 
similarities between Aereo and cable companies, considered in light of 
Congress’ basic purposes in amending the Copyright Act, convince us 
 
130   Id. at 2504. 
131   Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
132   Id. at 2504–07. 
133   Id. at 2506. 
134   Id. at 2507.  
135   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2507.  
136   See id. at 2503 (describing Aereo’s technology). 
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that this difference is not critical here.”137 
Next, the Court took on the difficult task of defining the 
performance, which is necessary to answer the next question regarding 
whether that performance is public.  The Court began this analysis by 
disregarding the text of the Copyright Act and substituting its own 
beliefs based on what “Congress would . . . have intended to protect a 
copyright holder from.”138  The basis for the majority’s ultimate 
conclusion is essentially that the Act does not mean what its text 
explicitly says.  According to the Court, “[t]he fact that a singular noun 
(‘a performance’) follows the words ‘to transmit’ does not suggest” 
that the performance involves only a singular transmission.139  Instead, 
the Court concluded that this statutory language “suggests that an 
entity may transmit a performance through multiple, discrete 
transmissions.”140  Ultimately, the majority “conclude[d] that when an 
entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images 
and sounds to multiple people, it transmits a performance to them 
regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes.”141  
Thus, the Court took the leap that the Second Circuit refused to take 
in Aereo II and adopted the aggregate audience approach. 
This resolution led to the holding that, “when Aereo streams the 
same television program to multiple subscribers, it ‘transmit[s] . . . a 
performance’ to all of them.”142  The Court recognized the commercial 
objective of Aereo’s business and brought the Ninth Circuit’s 
commercial nature analysis143 into play.144  Finally, after finding Aereo’s 
practices “highly similar to those of the CATV systems in Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter,” the Court “conclude[d] that Aereo ‘perform[ed]’ 
petitioners’ copyrighted works ‘publicly,’ as those terms are defined by 
the Transmit Clause.”145 
 
137   Id. at 2507. 
138   Id. at 2509.  
139   Id. 
140   Id.   
141   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509. 
142   Id. 
143   See Jacob Marshall, Note, Trading Rabbit Ears for Wi-Fi: Aereo, the Public Performance 
Right, and How Broadcasters Want to Control the Business of Internet TV, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 909, 934 (2014) (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is essentially that 
“because commercial enterprises necessarily open their services ‘to the public,’ any 
transmissions they make must transitively also be public”); see also Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012) 
(expanding on the Ninth Circuit’s commercial nature theory of infringement).  
144   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2508. 
145   Id. at 2511. 
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C. Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Scalia’s dissent stands in stark contrast both to the 
majority’s holding and to the entire progression of analysis used to 
reach the conclusion in the case.  The dissent began by stating that the 
public performance claim “fails at the very outset because Aereo does 
not ‘perform’ at all.”146  As opposed to the majority, Justice Scalia 
believes that “the question is who does the performing.”147  Since the 
issue is one of direct copyright infringement, Justice Scalia recognized 
that there could be liability only if Aereo itself had engaged in 
volitional conduct that violated the Copyright Act.148  Because the 
dissent found that Aereo’s subscribers were the actors, not Aereo itself, 
Justice Scalia concluded that Aereo had not performed at all and 
therefore could not be found liable for direct infringement.149 
Next, Justice Scalia performed a direct copyright infringement 
analysis, something the majority seemed to disregard entirely.  Justice 
Scalia’s inquiry noted that in order to be liable for direct infringement, 
as petitioners in this case argued, Aereo must have personally engaged 
in infringing conduct.150  This requirement, known as the “volitional-
conduct requirement,” has been a crucial element of finding direct 
copyright infringement since Sony.151  In a case like this one, where a 
system may be used to view both copyrighted works and non-
copyrighted works, “courts require ‘some aspect of volition’ directed 
at the copyrighted material before direct liability may be imposed.”152  
Generally, that issue is resolved by determining who selects the 
copyrighted content: the defendant or its customers.153  After working 
through this analysis, Justice Scalia ultimately determined that “Aereo 
does not ‘perform’ for the sole and simple reason that it does not make 
the choice of content.”154 
Justice Scalia then moved on to a discussion of the majority 
 
146   Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
147   Id. (emphasis in original).   
148   Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
149   Id. 
150   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)). 
151   Sony, 464 U.S. at 434; see also Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 747 F.3d 
1060, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2014); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc. 373 F.3d 544, 549–
50 (4th Cir. 2004). 
152   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting CoStar, 373 F.3d at 
550–51).  
153   Id. at 2513 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
154   Id. at 2514. 
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opinion, which, the Justice argued, suffered from a “trio of defects.”155  
First, the Court, perceiving the text to be ambiguous, relied on 
“snippets . . . from a single report issued by a committee whose 
members make up a small fraction of one of the two Houses of 
Congress” to give thrust to the interpretation necessary to support the 
majority’s ultimate conclusion.156 
Second, the Court disregarded every technical difference 
between Aereo’s system and CATV systems stating plainly, and without 
justification, that those dissimilarities “do[] not make a critical 
difference.”157  It is unclear whether the majority disregarded these 
differences because it did not understand the technological 
differences between the systems, but the looks-like-cable-TV standard, 
which the Court announced, certainly suggests that the Justices in the 
majority simply lacked the ability to discern the importance of 
technological differences between the systems. 
Third, Justice Scalia argued that “even accepting that the 1976 
amendments had as their purpose the overruling of [the Court’s] 
cable-TV cases, what they were meant to do and how they did it are two 
different questionsand it is the latter that governs the case before us 
here.”158  Justice Scalia recognized that Congress, in 1976, amended the 
Copyright Act in order to bring the operations of the CATV providers 
in the Fortnightly and Teleprompter cases within the purview of the Act, 
but the dissent did not accept the theory that the Act should now be 
interpreted to require analysis by analogy to those systems.  “The injury 
claimed is not violation of a law that says operations similar to cable TV 
are subject to copyright liability, but violation of § 106(4) of the 
Copyright Act.”159  The dissent did not believe that the Copyright Act, 
as written, included Aereo’s conduct within the meaning of a public 
performance. 
After detailing the trio of defects, Justice Scalia’s dissent pointed 
out that the majority’s opinion created two standards for direct 
copyright infringement: one that seems to apply to cable company 
look-alikes and one that applies to everyone else.160  The confusion 
created by this double standard will be shown immediately upon 
remand in this very case.  As Justice Scalia pointed out, “On remand, 
 
155   Id. at 2515. 
156   Id.   
157   Id. at 2507.   
158   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
159   Id. 
160   Id. at 2516. 
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one of the first questions the lower courts will face is whether Aereo’s 
‘record’ function . . . infringes the Networks’ public-performance 
right.”161  The volitional-conduct rule clearly answers that question in 
the negative, “[b]ut it is impossible to say how the issue will come out 
under the Court’s analysis, since cable companies did not offer remote 
recording and playback services when Congress amended the 
Copyright Act in 1976.”162 
It seems that Justice Scalia is not concerned with the Court’s 
ultimate disposition of the case.  In fact, Justice Scalia “share[d] the 
Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is doing (or enabling to be 
done) to the Networks’ copyrighted programming ought not to be 
allowed.”163 Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority’s opinion because 
it introduces more uncertainty into the law.  According to the dissent, 
“It will take years, perhaps decades, to determine which automated 
systems now in existence are governed by the traditional volitional-
conduct test and which get the Aereo treatment.”164 
Finally, Justice Scalia addressed the Court’s role in this case as 
compared with Congress’s role in legislating, a point which the 
majority failed to address.  “[W]hat we have before us must be 
considered a ‘loophole’ in the law.  It is not the role of this Court to 
identify and plug loopholes.  It is the role of good lawyers to identify 
and exploit them, and the role of Congress to eliminate them if it 
wishes.”165  Justice Scalia believes that “the proper course is not to bend 
and twist the Act’s terms in an effort to produce a just outcome, but to 
apply the law as it stands and leave to Congress the task of deciding 
whether the Copyright Act needs an upgrade.”166 
VI. LIVE AND LET DIE: THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN AEREO 
AND VOLITIONAL CONDUCT 
Careful determination of what constitutes a performance is 
crucial to the ultimate issue of whether that performance is public or 
private because only public performances are infringing under the 
Copyright Act.  An improper interpretation of what constitutes the 
performance may have detrimental effects on other types of 
technology that are already widely in use and generally considered 
 
161   Id. at 2517. 
162   Id. 
163   Id. 
164   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
165   Id.   
166   Id. at 2518. 
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non-infringing.  Though the dissent suggests that Aereo does not 
perform at all, this view seems to be foreclosed by the plain language 
of the statute, which includes transmissions as performances.167  Under 
the Copyright Act, one performs an audiovisual work by showing its 
images in any sequence, making the sounds accompanying it audible, 
or transmitting the work.168  The Act states, “[t]o ‘transmit’ a 
performance or display is to communicate it by any device or process 
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which 
they are sent.”169  Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, 
both the user and Aereo perform whenever the user watches a 
program using Aereo’s service.  The user, through his Internet-
connected device, shows the images on screen and makes the sounds 
accompanying them audible so that he can enjoy the program.  Aereo 
transmits the program from its antennas through the transcoders and 
servers to the user’s device. 
But recall that the Copyright Act does not prohibit the 
transmission of a copyrighted work; § 106(4) only prohibits a public 
performance.  Therefore, the real issue is whether Aereo’s 
performance is a public one.  This is where the Court makes use of the 
looks-like-cable-TV standard and other analogies to reach the 
erroneous conclusion that Aereo performs publicly.  The proper 
course of action would have been to apply the Copyright Act as written 
to find each particular transmission to be a private performance, which 
would allow the legislature to make any necessary amendments after 
assessing the impact that a new business like Aereo has on the cable 
industry as a whole.  After all, the public, not the author, is supposed 
to be the biggest beneficiary of the copyright laws. 
A. Ruling by Unnecessary Analogy 
First, the majority concluded that “Congress would as much have 
intended to protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities 
of Aereo as from those of cable companies.”170  The fact that the Court 
believed that Congress, in the 1970s, would have intended certain 
protections implies that, in fact, Congress did not explicitly protect a 
copyright holder from Aereo-type activities.  If Congress had so 
intended, then why would the Court not say “Congress intended . . . “?  
 
167   See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014) (“To perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to 
transmit or otherwise communicate . . . the work . . . .”).   
168   Id. 
169   Id.   
170   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509 (emphasis added).   
BROWN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/4/2015  11:48 AM 
268 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:243 
The answer must be that the Court substituted its beliefs in the year 
2014 for what the majority believes Congress might have intended fifty 
years before; note also that the Court cites no authority for this 
conclusion.  In fact, Congress would have needed a crystal ball to 
formulate any thoughts at all on Aereo-type services before or during 
the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, considering that personal 
computers were not introduced until the early 1980s, the first 
experiment linking commercial email to the Internet was just getting 
underway in 1988, and the first publicly available web-browser was not 
launched until 1993.171 
Next, the Court played an interpretation game with the statutory 
language to conclude, again without citing any authority, that “the fact 
that a singular noun (‘a performance’) follows the words ‘to transmit’ 
does not suggest” that each individual transmission is a separate 
performance.172  This finding is crucial to the Court’s holding; without 
giving a singular noun a plural meaning, the Court could not have 
reached its ultimate holding.  It is not surprising that the Court cites 
no authority for such a form of statutory construction considering that 
the weight of authority is clearly contrary.173 
The Court then used these findings to announce what is 
essentially the aggregate audience principle previously discussed 
within this Comment.  The majority “conclude[d] that when an entity 
communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and 
sounds to multiple people, it transmits a performance to them 
regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes.”174  All 
that matters is that people have received the same underlying work 
from a single entity.  If those people constitute the public and the 
perceptible images and sounds are copyrighted, then following Aereo, 
the entity making the transmission has directly infringed the copyright 
holder’s exclusive right to perform the work publicly regardless of 
whether the entity actually engaged in any infringing conduct itself. 
To understand the impact of the Court’s decision on other 
technologies beyond cable television and cable television look-a-likes, 
 
171   Internet Service Provider (ISP), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2015), available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/746032/Internet-service-provider-
ISP. 
172   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.   
173   See Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“We have 
stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what 
it means and means in a statute what it says there.”) (citing United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989); United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 
102–03 (1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. 53 (1810)). 
174   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.  
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consider the following hypothetical.  Dropbox is now a popular file-
sharing service that uses cloud-computing technology to allow users to 
share any files.  Hypothetically, if a law student were to upload a digital 
copy of a Parks and Recreation175 episode to Dropbox and share it with 
forty-five people from his 1L class, then clearly Dropbox has directly 
infringed NBC’s copyright, right?  Dropbox is an entity, and through 
Dropbox’s technology the same contemporaneously perceptible 
images and sounds have been communicated to forty-five separate 
people who must be considered the public.  This seems like an odd 
result since most people would react by saying, “But wait, Dropbox 
never really did anything wrong.”  This is the problem with the Aereo 
decision. 
To avoid this far-reaching consequence, instead of focusing on 
the Transmit Clause’s first reference to “a performance,” the Court 
should have focused on the definitive “the performance,” which clearly 
indicates that the statute is concerned with a single performance.176  
The text of the Copyright Act itself provides ample evidence that a 
single performance is the correct interpretation.  The Act expressly 
defines a public performance as one where “the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the same place or 
in separate places.”177  This makes sense in light of the Congressional 
intent to bring CATV providers within the bounds of the Copyright 
Act, since those providers were sending a single transmission (a single 
performance) to all of their customers; thus, the ratio of transmissions 
to subscribers was one transmission to many subscribers.  The key 
difference with Aereo’s technology is that each transmission is only 
capable of being received by a single subscriber.  In other words, the 
ratio here is one transmission to one subscriber.  Therefore, the 
performance is only capable of being received in one place by one user, 
which should remove it from the purview of the Transmit Clause 
altogether because the performance is private, not public. 
Now we reach the most critical step in the Court’s decision: the 
majority’s refusal to consider any technological differences between 
CATV providers of the 1960s and Aereo.  While the majority 
acknowledged at least one technological difference between CATV 
systems and Aereo’s technologynamely that CATV providers sent 
continuous streams to all subscribers while Aereo’s system was inert 
until the subscriber selected a programthe Court concluded that 
 
175   A copyrighted broadcast television program that originally aired on NBC. 
176   See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014). 
177   Id. (emphasis added).  
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“this sole technological difference between Aereo and traditional cable 
companies does not make a critical difference here.”178  The fact that 
the majority seems to think that this is the sole technological difference 
between the systems shows a lack of understanding of the technologies 
at issue.  Of primary concern is the majority’s reasoning behind the 
irrelevancy of this technological difference. 
The Court claimed that because this difference is “invisible to 
subscriber and broadcaster alike,”179 it should be ignored.  This 
rationale seems unsupported; the Transmit Clause does not reference 
the visibility of the technology that drives the process delivering the 
content.  The Court has dismissed the technical intricacies and focused 
solely on input and output.  Undermining the already feeble 
conclusion that this technological difference does not matter is the 
Court’s acknowledgement, immediately following the invisibility claim, 
that, “In other cases involving different kinds of service or technology 
providers, a user’s involvement in the operation of the provider’s 
equipment and selection of the content transmitted may well bear on 
whether the provider performs within the meaning of the Act.”180  
These differences, however, are not to be considered when other 
“similarities” between the technologies at issue “convince [the Court] 
that [the] difference is not critical.”181 
What the Court appears to evaluate is not the technology at all, 
but the end result of a process.  Engineers call this type of analysis 
“black-box testing,” meaning that the system is viewed solely in terms 
of its input and output without any knowledge of its internal 
workings.182  The Court does not inquire into whether the black-box is 
made up of coaxial cables connected to a giant antenna to send a 
constant stream to all subscribers or whether it is comprised of dime-
sized antennas connected to the Internet through a complex process 
of transcoders and buffers to send a limited signal to a single 
subscriber.  What matters to the Court is that television programs are 
being transmitted and broadcasters are unpaid.  The problem is that 
the Court gives no guidance as to which technologies qualify for a user 
involvement inquiry and which get the black-box treatment. 
A final example of the contradictory nature of the Court’s 
decision comes directly from the majority’s claim that cable system 
 
178   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2507. 
179   Id. 
180   Id.   
181   Id.   
182   RON PATTON, SOFTWARE TESTING 55 (2d ed. 2006). 
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DVRs will be unaffected by the ruling.  Cablevision has stood for the 
proposition that a cable provider does not need to pay any additional 
fees to broadcasters in order to provide DVR services, even though 
cable providers split the one incoming signal for which they actually 
pay into two streams in order to provide these services.183  The court 
determined that the DVR service was providing private, not public, 
performances since only the singular customer who requested the 
recording could watch the recorded program from a particular DVR.184  
Clearly, DVR copies of a program communicate the same underlying 
work to multiple people, who constitute the public, through multiple 
transmissions.  It is difficult to reconcile the Court’s definition of what 
constitutes direct infringement of the public performance right with 
the continued legality of DVR services. 
B. Schrödinger’s185 Cable Company 
An additional issue with the Court’s ruling by analogy to outdated 
technology is that it leaves Aereo in a precarious position after the 
decision.  The Copyright Act makes many provisions for cable 
companies, including the § 111 provision for compulsory licensing 
agreements.186  If Aereo were to qualify as a cable system under the Act, 
then it would be allowed to continue its operations after paying the 
broadcasters a fee, which would ultimately drive up the cost of Aereo’s 
service, but not kill the company and its technology entirely.  This is 
not the case with Aereo because the Court did not hold that Aereo was 
a cable system under the § 111; instead, the Court held that because 
there were so many similarities between Aereo and CATV providers of 
the 1960s, Aereo was violating § 106(4) of the Copyright Act.187 
The Second Circuit, where this case is being tried, has circuit 
precedent that stands for the proposition that Internet streaming 
companies like Aereo are not cable systems within the meaning of § 
 
183   Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2008). 
184   Id. at 137. 
185   See Erwin Schrodinger, FAMOUS SCIENTISTS, http://www.famousscientists.org/ 
erwin-schrodinger-2/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (stating that Erwin Schrödinger was a 
Nobel Prize-winning Austrian physicist who focused much of his career on quantum 
theory.  However, he may be best known today for a thought experiment he developed 
to explain a theory of quantum mechanics known colloquially as Schrödinger’s Cat.  
The executive summary involves a cat in a closed container and there is some random 
event that may, with equal chances, either take place or not take place within the 
closed container, but if it does, it will kill the cat.  Thus, while the container remains 
closed, the cat is equal parts dead and alive.).  
186   See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2014). 
187      17 U.S.C. § 106(4). 
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111 of the Copyright Act.188  The Second Circuit did not create this 
rule; instead, it is an acknowledgement that “[t]he Copyright Office 
has consistently concluded that Internet retransmission services are 
not cable systems and do not qualify for § 111 compulsory licenses.”189  
This inconsistent treatment between related sections of the Copyright 
Act creates quite the conundrum for Internet streaming services. 
If Aereo, according to the Supreme Court, infringes § 106(4) 
because it is too much like a cable company, yet it does not qualify for 
a compulsory license under § 111 of the same statute because the 
Copyright Office has concluded that Internet streaming services are 
not cable systems, then what type of beast is Aereo?  Perhaps Aereo is 
a Schrödinger’s cable company of sorts; both a cable company and not 
a cable company at the same time. 
Unlike Schrödinger’s famous thought experiment, Aereo’s 
situation was actually remanded by the Supreme Court for the district 
court to decide.190  Upon remand, Aereo made three new arguments 
against the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.191  First, 
Aereo argued “that in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Aereo III, 
it should be considered a ‘cable system’ that is entitled to a compulsory 
license under § 111 of the Copyright Act.”192  The argument was that 
because the Supreme Court determined that Aereo was sufficiently 
similar to a cable system to come within the purview of the 1976 
amendments to the Copyright Act with respect to the Transmit Clause, 
it should also be found sufficiently similar to a cable system for 
purposes of the § 111 compulsory license since that section was added 
to the Act as part of a single statutory scheme that Congress developed 
to handle CATV provider copyright liability.193 
The district court rejected Aereo’s argument, finding that “the 
Supreme Court consistently stated throughout its opinion that Aereo’s 
similarity to CATV systems informed its conclusion that Aereo 
performs, not that Aereo is a cable system.”194  The court went on to 
note the Supreme Court’s silence on the § 111 issue, but determined 
that the “void . . . is filled by on-point, binding Second Circuit 
 
188   See WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 284–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
Internet streaming company ivi was not a cable system under the Copyright Act). 
189   Id. at 283.   
190   Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo IV), No. 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
150555 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014). 
191   Id. at *12–13. 
192   Id. at *13.  
193   Id. at *16–17. 
194   Id. at *17. 
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precedent“195 from WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc.196  In concluding the § 111 
analysis, the court noted that Congress, in 1988, added § 119 of the 
Copyright Act to provide compulsory licenses for satellite TV providers 
who did not qualify for those licenses under § 111.197  Congress may 
ultimately determine that another provision should be made for 
Aereo-type services, but until then, compulsory licenses are not 
available to these Internet-streaming services. 
The district court ultimately granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction “barring Aereo from retransmitting programs 
to its subscribers while the programs are still being broadcast.”198  
Though this ruling only technically barred Aereo from using the 
“Watch” aspect of its service, the company ceased all operations, 
presumably because of users’ ability to use the “Record” function in 
essentially the same manner as the “Watch” function. 
Although Aereo elected to discontinue its entire service, it is 
worth taking a brief moment to think about what the Supreme Court’s 
opinion really decided.  Aereo cannot allow users to watch any 
programming while it is currently airing, but so long as Aereo’s system 
does not allow a user to click “Play” until one second after the program 
has aired, it may continue to provide users access to copyrighted 
material without violating the Copyright Act and without paying 
broadcasters any fee. 
This situation shows exactly why the Court should not have used 
the looks-like-cable-TV standard adopted by the majority in the Aereo 
decision.  The problem is that the Court, while attempting to vindicate 
the supposed intentions of Congress, is not able to provide this new 
type of cable-look-a-like with statutorily authorized compulsory licenses 
to transmit content like Congress provided for CATV systems in 1976.  
While Congress clearly intended to bring the CATV systems of the 
1960s within reach of the Copyright Act, the drafters also provided a 
way for those companies to remain in business and continue to provide 
services that benefit the American people.  Congress enacted § 111, 
which allows the government to monitor and maintain a fair price for 
compulsory licenses to transmit copyrighted programming, striking 
the proper balance between promoting the progress of science and 
securing to authors exclusive rights in their works.199  Congress was able 
 
195   Id. at *20.   
196   WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012). 
197   Aereo IV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *26–27. 
198   Id. at *40.   
199   See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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to find a suitable balance because of its ability to thoroughly weigh the 
competing interests of the nation and create laws that attempt to strike 
the appropriate constitutional and societal balance. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, for good reason, is 
generally reluctant to go beyond the specific issues presented in a 
particular case.  While the Court announced that companies with 
sufficient similarities to cable providers infringe copyright protections, 
the majority does not have the legislative power to provide that those 
same companies also qualify for compulsory licenses.  This deficiency 
shows just one reason why the Court erred in straying from the 
traditional volitional conduct requirement to establish a new test 
specific to companies that strike the Court as sufficiently similar to 
CATV companies of five decades ago. 
Instead, the Court should have applied the traditional volitional 
conduct test to find that Aereo was not infringing on a protected 
copyright and then deferred to Congress to determine the 
ramifications of this technological advancement on the 1976 Act.  Such 
a decision would have given Congress the opportunity to debate and 
balance the competing interests in order to make a decision as to 
whether or not Internet-streaming services like Aereo should be swept 
under the Copyright Act’s protections, and furthermore, whether 
those streaming services should be lumped together with cable systems 
or put into their own unique category.  Congress would then have the 
opportunity to provide compulsory licensing for those streaming 
companies in order to provide opportunities for useful technology to 
deliver beneficial services to the American people while still offering 
some level of protection for copyright holders.  Instead, the Court cuts 
Aereo down at the knees, which caused Aereo to suspend its service 
and file for bankruptcy, and created an air of uncertainty in the 
Internet-streaming and cloud computing industries that undoubtedly 
has stifled the development of useful technology because of the 
unclear legal grounds for marketing those technologies. 
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C. Erosion of the Volitional Conduct Requirement 
The volitional conduct requirement is central to the law of 
copyright liability because it distinguishes between direct and 
secondary liability.200  Direct infringement occurs “when an actor 
personally engages in infringing conduct”201 or where “the defendant 
itself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.”202  On 
the other hand, secondary liability “is a means of holding defendants 
responsible for infringement by third parties, even when the 
defendants ‘have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity.’”203  
The distinction in most suits against equipment manufacturers or 
service providers is drawn by determining whether the manufacturer, 
or provider, itself engaged in the infringing conduct or whether it was 
the customer who committed the volitional act.204  This is the case 
because the Copyright Act does not expressly impute liability to any 
person or company for another’s infringement.205 
The majority and the dissent seem to be on opposite ends of the 
spectrum when it comes to volitional conduct.  The majority never 
even mentions the term “volitional conduct,”206 but the dissent rests its 
conclusionthat Aereo does not performon the fact that Aereo 
users are the actors making the choice of content.207  This dichotomy 
creates a point of tension that will not only create confusion in years to 
come, but has already had a significant impact on similar pending 
cases.208  In fact, pleadings have already been filed in the United States 
district courts arguing that a majority of the Supreme Court in Aereo 
“acknowledgedand ultimately dismissedthe dissent’s call for 
 
200   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2514 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
201   Id. at 2512 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 433 (1984)). 
202   Id. at 2513 (citing CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550–51 (4th 
Cir. 2004)). 
203   Id. at 2512 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 435).   
204   Id. at 2512. 
205   Sony, 464 U.S. at 434. 
206   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2498–2511. 
207   Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
208   See Getty Images (U.S.), Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 61 F. Supp. 3d 296, 300 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (plaintiff arguing that volition is not required for direct 
infringement); Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 27, Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, 2014 WL 10100767 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2015) 
(No. 12-CV-04529(DMG)), 2014 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3675 (arguing that the 
Dish Anywhere platform directly infringes Fox’s copyrights after Aereo).  
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‘volition’ as an element of direct infringement.”209 
The dissent’s argument is straightforward and comports with the 
Court’s previous cases involving direct infringement of an equipment 
manufacturer or service provider that offers a product to the public 
that is capable of infringing use.210  There is one rule for direct 
infringement: “A defendant may be held directly liable only if it has 
engaged in volitional conduct that violates the Act.”211  Accordingly, the 
dissent determined that the first question to be answered with respect 
to direct infringement is whether Aereo itself engaged in the volitional 
conduct.  Much like in Sony, Aereo simply provides equipment that a 
customer can use to record and watch some television programming. 
According to the undisputed facts, “Aereo’s automated system 
does not relay any program, copyrighted or not, until a subscriber 
selects the program and tells Aereo to relay it.”212  Aereo is nothing 
more than a warehouse full of metal until a customer makes a demand; 
Justice Scalia likens it to a copy shop that allows patrons to use copy 
machines to copy any material they please, whether copyrighted or 
not.213  In both cases, the operation of the system is a volitional act and 
a but-for cause of the infringing conduct, but “that degree of 
involvement is not enough for direct liability.”214  Based on the 
longstanding volitional conduct requirement, Justice Scalia 
determined that “Aereo does not ‘perform’ for the sole and simple 
reason that it does not make the choice of content.”215  This is the only 
 
209   Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 13 n.8, Getty Images (U.S.), Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 147532 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2014) (NO. 14-CV-7114(DLC)). 
210   See e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550–51 (4th Cir. 2004); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984).  
211   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
212   Id. at 2514.   
213   Id. at 2513–14 (“A copy shop rents out photocopiers on a per-use basis.  One 
customer might copy his 10-year-old’s drawings—a perfectly lawful thing to do—while 
another might duplicate a famous artist’s copyrighted photographs—a use clearly 
prohibited by § 106(1).  Either way, the customer chooses the content and activates the 
copying function; the photocopier does nothing except in response to the customer’s 
commands.  Because the shop plays no role in selecting the content, it cannot be held 
directly liable when a customer makes an infringing copy. . . . the fact that the copy 
shop does not choose the content simply means that its culpability will be assessed 
using secondary-liability rules rather than direct-liability rules.”) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. 
at 434–42; CoStar, 373 F.3d at 550; Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2008)).   
214   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2513–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. 
at 960 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he producer of a technology which permits 
unlawful copying does not himself engage in unlawful copying. . . .”)). 
215   Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2514.   
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possible conclusion that the Court can reach using the traditional 
volitional conduct requirement.  This conclusion does not mean that 
Aereo is off the hook; instead, Aereo, while not being directly liable, 
will under the same facts certainly be found to have produced 
equipment capable of infringing copyrights, making a finding of 
contributory infringement likely.216 
The problem with the Aereo decision, with respect to volitional 
conduct, lies in the fact that the majority of the Court failed to even 
mention the only test for direct copyright infringement that the Court 
has ever supported in the past.  The majority was so bothered by what 
Aereo was doing that the Court flew right past volitional conduct to 
establish a new test, which is applicable only to those technologies that, 
in a black-box analysis, resemble CATV systems of the 1960s.  Justice 
Breyer failed to mention volitional conduct, not because of its 
irrelevancy, but because it would undermine the majority’s position, as 
it is the user that selects which program to view or record, not Aereo 
or Aereo’s system. 
To demonstrate the flaws inherent in the majority’s new standard, 
consider a hypothetical with all of the facts of the Aereo case, but one 
key difference.  Instead of capturing broadcast television signals, 
assume that Aereo is, at the request of the user, capturing copyrighted 
radio broadcasts (e.g., an NPR broadcast).  Aereo still uses its 
warehouse of antennas and produces user-specific copies that are 
transmitted via the Internet to only the specific user who requested to 
listen to the program.  What result now?  Congress did not amend the 
Copyright Act to address any issues with radio broadcasts, so 
presumably there is no looks-like-a-radio-broadcast test that the Court 
could formulate from legislative history.  One would think that in this 
hypothetical, the Court would have to apply the only test there is for 
direct infringement: the volitional conduct requirement.  The result is 
a fractured copyright law where television broadcasters receive more 
protection than radio broadcasters by virtue of the fact that the last 
major overhaul of the Copyright Act was in response to the 
proliferation of CATV systems. 
Recall, this is an appeal of limited scope.  All that the Court is 
dealing with is an appeal from the denial of a motion for a preliminary 
injunction against Aereo alleging direct infringement of the plaintiffs’ 
public performance right for only the “Watch” portion of Aereo’s 
service, which allows users to contemporaneously view broadcast 
 
216   See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913 (describing contributory infringement); Sony, 
464 U.S. at 417 (describing the difference between fair use and contributory 
infringement). 
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programs on Aereo’s system while those programs are being aired.217  
By no means did the Court need to rule against Aereo on this specific 
appeal in order for Aereo to be found liable for some form of copyright 
infringement.  The plaintiffs in the case alleged multiple theories of 
liability “including infringement of the public performance right, 
infringement of the right of reproduction, and contributory 
infringement.”218 
If the majority were to apply the traditional volitional conduct test 
to the facts at bar, the outcome almost certainly would have been in 
favor of Aereo.  Instead, the Court has opened the door to uncertainty; 
now that there is a special direct infringement test for “cable systems,” 
what is to keep the Court from expanding to other tests for other 
industries?  Copyright law is an ever-changing beast, as it must be, 
because the introduction of new technology changes societal norms 
requiring changes in the law to keep up with technological and societal 
progress.  The Founders wisely left the power to amend the law to 
Congress because it is a delicate process that requires the balancing of 
competing interests in an ever-changing society.  The Court is not the 
place to fashion new standards on a case-by-case basis because having 
a different copyright law standard for each technology capable of 
producing copyrightable works is impracticable and inefficient.  
Congress is able to weigh competing interests in developing new laws 
that strive to strike an appropriate balance between technological and 
scientific progress and the rights that should be afforded to the 
creators of artistic works. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the end, the basis for disagreement with respect to the Aereo 
decision comes down to separation of powers and the role that the 
Court should play in creating the law.  The majority seems to believe 
that it is the Court’s role to expand protections provided by the 
Copyright Act to reach those technologies, which, in the Court’s view, 
would have been a target of Congress half a century ago.  On the other 
hand, those who believe in the separation of powers view the 
expansion of copyright protection as a job for Congress, which is given 
the sole authority to create such laws under the Constitution.  The flaws 
in the Aereo decision clearly demonstrate why the Court is an improper 
venue for the creation of legislation.  In order for the majority to reach 
a conclusion, the Justices had to create a new standard for direct 
 
217   See supra text accompanying notes 119 & 120.   
218   Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).   
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copyright infringement, which applies only to a single type of entity, 
and is unsupported by any precedent.  While Congress is in a position 
to make full-scale updates to the Copyright Act and provide new 
avenues for emerging technologies to fit neatly within a system that 
respects not only the rights of copyright holders but also the societal 
advantages of scientific progress, the Court has no such power.  
Instead, the Court has created a rule, with no specific guidelines, that 
applies to only one section of the Copyright Act for one specific type 
of technology and has no bearing on other sections of the Copyright 
Act.  In adopting the looks-like-cable-TV standard, the Court 
simultaneously disregarded the traditional volitional conduct test.  
While the majority opinion never expressly rejected the test, briefs in 
the district courts following the ruling show that parties are reading 
the opinion to indicate such a rejection.  What we are left with is a 
fragmented and drastically expanded state of copyright law that will 
take years to piece back together. 
 
